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Introduction
China's growth strategy as set out in the 11 th 5-year plan in 2005 called for upgrading of product quality, the development of an innovation society, and reduced reliance on foreign intellectual property with high license fees. This policy is reflected in Chinese efforts in global standard setting for the third generation (3G) of a wireless telecommunications standard. China successfully negotiated the adoption of its own standard (TD-SCDMA) in the International
Telecommunications Union in 2000, and Chinese enterprises have been engaged in its commercial development since. Most recently, the allocation of licenses has been announced.
Here we both document and evaluate this experience.
In the history of wireless technology development, only the EU, the United States, Japan and more recently South Korea have participated in standards setting activities. This is the first time that a non-OECD / developing country has participated in this firm concentrated and highly R&D-intensive area of activity. The Chinese third generation wireless standard (3G) is named TD-SCDMA (Time Division -Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access), and since its initial submission as a response to a call for proposal by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 1997 it has received substantial support from the Chinese government in both negotiation and commercialization. More recently, after eight years of development, TD-SCDMA has moved on from a concept to a fledging industry. A large-scale trial network covering 10 Chinese cities is now under way and 28 more cities are planned to be covered. In overseas markets, a trial network is in service in South Korea and a commercial network has been put into use in Italy.
China's stated motives for entering this highly firm-concentrated and R&D intensive area are to reduce the high license fees to foreign IPR holders, but also to put in place the basis for future standards development. Taking a broader view, this standard setting initiative is part of a growth strategy of creating an "innovative economy" covering education, R&D, and mega projects delineated in an important state directive The Guidelines on National Medium-and
Long-term Program for Science and Technology Development 2006-2020.
For China, the main challenge posed by this standard setting experience has come in finding successful commercialization. The appropriate commercialization strategy for the government to follow is unclear from literature. The TD-SCDMA standard has yet to receive wide deployment in either domestic or overseas markets. It has also been hard to follow other countries' experience due to difference in technology capacity, market position and other factors.
Another challenge has been the emergence of an alternative system which claims to be an advance on all the current major wireless systems including TD-SCDMA -the IP-based
WiMAX system which has higher data rate transmission and lower costs with wider coverage per base station. A problem, therefore, is that even if the commercialization succeeds, it may soon be overtaken by WiMAX. Critics of WiMAX argue that it is poor in mobility which is supposedly an important feature of wireless mobile system. Nevertheless, WiMAX has already been deployed by Sprint and Clearwire in the US, and SK in Korea.
Thus challenges remain for China in further commercialization and market deployment of the TD-SCDMA standard. But China's commitment to its deployment, especially in the domestic market, is unwavering. They claim that the trial TD-SCDMA network covering 10 cities is currently the largest network in the world, and with learning-by-doing the technology is expected to improve further and has the potential to overtake the other two standards which are currently more advanced in technological maturity. In May 2008, Chinese government carried out the restructuring of telecommunications operators 2 which was widely thought to precede the final issuance of repeatedly postponed 3G licenses. Recently the Minister for Industry and Information Technology has announced how the third-generation (3G) mobile telecom licenses will be issued to Chinese operators at the beginning of 2009 3 .
In the sections that follow, we document Chinese participation both in the global 3G standards negotiation and the subsequent commercialization of China's homegrown standard.
This is followed by a brief exploration of its future given the competitive emergence of an alternative technology WiMAX. We then evaluate the likely success of this initiative in both the short and long term, stressing the challenges in commercialization beyond the negotiation of the standard.
Chinese 3G Global Standards Negotiation
We first discuss the successful negotiation of the Chinese 3G standard in the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 2000, the first such standard negotiated by a developing country. The 3G negotiation was different from the standard setting experience in the first and second generations of wireless standards where nation or regional entities (i.e. the European Union) played a dominant role. The third generation was initiated and harmonized by ITU, a 2 On May 24th, 2008, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance, PRC. jointly issued a statement of "Notification of Furthering Telecommunications Industry Reform" and announced a restructuring plan for the country's telecom operators. According to the restructuring plan, the existing six Chinese operators will be changed into the pattern of "3+1″, with China Unicom's CDMA business incorporated into China Telecom to form a new China Telecom company, China Unicom's GSM network included into China Netcom to form a new China Unicom, China Tietong incorporated into China Mobile to form a new China Mobile company, and China Satcom remaining unchanged. 3 See page 25 for details.
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The ITU follows a voting policy on its decisions of equal weight per country (i.e. each member country has one vote). In recent decades the ITU has shifted from an emphasis on spectrum allocation to one on standards setting which is reflected in increased amounts of money spent on the ITU-over a quarter of a billion U.S. dollars in -2004 (Ryan, 2005 ).
Ryan (2005) argues that the ITU's legal authority in the international telecommunications area has been diluted by regional and sovereign interests to the point that it plays mostly a voluntary consensus-seeking function. The ITU lacks legal structure (it does not have a permanent charter), and it is possible for it to dissolve at any point if member countries no longer perceive value in the consensus-building approach that it offers. Thus the ITU must achieve consensus in standards negotiation; its standards must be found to be useful, and, in spite of its long standing existence, it must constantly demonstrate its value to its members to survive.
The acceptance of the TD-SCDMA standard as one of the major 3G global standards by the ITU in 2000 was a great success for China. It is the only one successfully negotiated by a developing country in ITU 5 . 4 As Ryan (2005) notes, the ITU was established in 1865 as an European organization from the outset. For more than fifty years, European powers controlled the ITU (originally called the International Telegraph Union), and its voting system favoured the largest European countries. After its involvement in World War II, the United States began to take a more active interest in participating in international telecommunications standardization efforts through the United Nations. However, the United States still viewed the ITU as a hindrance to the management of radio communications (through what it viewed as the ITU's imposition of state-imposed policies versus its own laissez-faire policies and ideals). The United States only appointed temporary ambassadors to attend ITU radio conferences. In the 1980s, however, the ITU began to loosen its policies, which had favoured PTTs and similar government organizations. Although U.S. participation in the ITU is still tentative, the level of U.S. involvement has continued to gain momentum ever since. 5 The IMT-2000 conference initially had the objective of consolidating all the submitted CDMA-based proposals into a single standard, and the submitted TDD proposals into another standard. This objective changed, however, as work progressed. Its final recommendation (ITU 2000a) was for five different radio interfaces to be adopted for terrestrial IMT-2000 services:
The first was equivalent to the Euro-Japanese Wideband CDMA solution, the second was the U.S. CDMA2000 solution, the third was the Euro-China TDMA/CDMA hybrid (TD-SCDMA), the fourth was the evolution of D-AMPS and GSM to EDGE 8 , and the fifth was ETSI's DECT 9 .
The first three of these were effectively 3G standards. Though it was claimed by Chinese press to be a breakthrough indicating that TD-SCDMA had been accepted not only by the ITU but also by an industry alliance of operators and vendors, its concrete impact awaited its commercialization.
TD-SCDMA Commercialization
The commercialization of the Chinese 3G standard has proved to be challenging. 
Spectrum Allocation
The commercialization of the TD-SCDMA standard has also been integrally involved with spectrum allocation. This has yet to be finalized as licenses are yet to be issued, but the decisions made in this area will influence the success of the commercialization. Currently, TD-SCDMA technology only uses the core spectrum range of 55M. The extra 100MHz assigned is thought to be advantageous for the global deployment of TD-SCDMA because this range is not used by WCDMA and CDMA2000. This means that the TD-SCDMA standard can be a complementary extension network when operators face spectrum shortage.
An outcome of the spectrum allocation favoring TD-SCDMA deployment in the future was that Siemens announced a follow-up investment of €50 million for the development of TD-SCDMA the following day of the 3G spectrum allocation announcement 20 .
Spectrum was assigned free to operators in China during the 1G and 2G deployment, but as a scarce resource, it had been allocated by auction in most of the OECD countries. In the 3G spectrum allocation, auction was again widely adopted in the EU, which contributed large revenue to the governments, especially in EU (see Table 13 would adopt spectrum auctions in the 3G deployment. This will facilitate commercialization of the TD-SCDMA standard, but at a cost to the Chinese government of revenues. 2006, Spreadtrum had 10% of China GSM/GPRS market 22 . These developments implied both that access to the TD-SCDMA standard could grow through these chip developments and also 22 The other major competitors on China market are MTK (40%), TI (23%), ADI (10%), Philips (6%), Agere (4%), Inflieon (3%), in brackets are their market shares. See http://www.eefocus.com/html/06-12/120_1166415091.shtml.
that competitive technologies were also more widely available.
Recently, China Mobile joined this alliance in July, 2008, being the first operator member of this alliance. China Mobile is the best performing telecommunications operator in China, its participation is expected to have influential impact on the TD-SCDMA commercialization.
So far, leveraging Chinese government's support, the TD-SCDMA alliance has covered the whole industry chain including operating, manufacturing (e.g., chipset, platform software, handset, antenna, infrastructure equipment and testing instruments) and sales channeling.
Currently, the alliance has 58 members, providing technologies over the whole industry chain Forum also signed partnership agreements with major international telecom organizations, such as GSMA and CDG. The Forum now has over 300 members from more than 30 countries, 23 GSMA was committed to promoting GSM and WCDMA which are both dominantly sponsored by EU telecommunications standard setting organization, ETSI. CDG was established to promote CDMA and the evolved 3G 
Evaluation of China's 3G Experience
Evaluating the success of China's efforts at TD-SCDMA standards negotiation and subsequent commercialization and the lessons it offers for similar further efforts is difficult since at this stage commercialization remains in progress. It seems fair to say that this process has been slower than at first thought, but it is still possible that major financial rewards will result. It is too early to tell. As we mention in our introduction, China's motives for engaging in this highly firm-concentrated and R&D intensive area are to reduce license fees paid to foreign IPR holders; to set the basis for standards development; and more broadly, to integrate the standard setting initiatives into the state strategy of creating an "innovative economy". And even if for now commercialization is largely restricted to the Chinese market the first of these objectives will likely be met.
License Fee Reduction
It is still too early to assess the benefits of license fee reduction from TD-SCDMA. One This so-called indigenous Chinese standard has a substantial portion of foreign patents 36 which increase the difficulty of licensing fees negotiation given the IPR policies adopted by some incumbent companies such as Qualcomm.
recommended that no standards requirements be put on the licensees." 34 See "Ericsson, Qualcomm Resolve Wireless Phone Dispute" http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5553/is_/ai_n22392652. 35 See "Qualcomm and Nokia Settle Patent Lawsuit", http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/24/technology/qualcomm.php. 36 It is hard to estimate the number of patents in the TD-SCDMA. It varies widely in different reports, ranging from 7% to over 50% for China share in the total patents.
In the absence of an established licensing mechanism 37 , an option for Chinese manufacturers and others to cope with blocking patents (e.g., system for code division multi-access communication) is to pursue alternative technologies to replace the blocking one.
Both South Korea and China are currently making efforts to develop OFDM (orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing), MIMO (multiple input and multiple output) and other technologies, hoping they can be used to avoid the blocking patent. The aim is to break Qualcomm's monopoly position in the CDMA-based standard competition era.
Learning as the Basis for Future Standards Development
The experience of developing TD-SCDMA, and its success or failure, will also help build up China's know-how in negotiation and commercialization of standardization in general, which, in turn, will benefit further standard-setting activities such as 4G. This has also been an objective of Chinese policy in this area.
It is not clear which strategy that China adopted secured the success in the negotiation in ITU. One view is that Chinese negotiators maneuvered by allying with the US and EU and leveraging its promising domestic market. This tactic might not be repeatable in the follow-on standard setting negotiations, since concrete alliances need to be established based on joint technology cooperation and common commercial interests.
Also Chinese TD-SCDMA commercialization up to now remains unproven, although clearly lessons have been learned for future commercialization. One issue is the repeatedly postponed licensing which is sometimes attributed to the less than satisfactory testing performance of TD-SCDMA trial network to allow more time for the TD-SCDMA to improve 37 One of the criteria of entering TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance is the sharing of IPRs which is not accepted by the incumbent wholly-owned foreign companies.
its performance. This strategy of improving the success probability of a homegrown standard by facilitating its earlier deployment in the domestic market or naming it the national standard is a common practice in almost all of the countries involved in global standards setting.
According to Gessler (2002) 's detailed description of the 2G and 3G standardization process in the United States and EU, it seems that though the United States claims to apply a "hands-off" approach in standards selection, the United States may have delayed the 2G licensing in order to give CDMA (which is sponsored mainly by an American company -Qualcomm) some time to improve its technical performance. In the 3G deployment, the European Commission overtly requires European countries to license IMT-2000 bands to an ETSI standard (WCDMA).
Gandal, Salant and Waverman (2003) notes that "the reason for their favoring WCDMA is possibly due to the fact that it puts them on even footing with CDMA 2G equipment suppliers and operators whereas CDMA2000 would give the latter a competitive cost and time to market advantage".
The benefits of first deployment in the market are that, the first system deployed is expected to improve faster than the followers based on learning-by-doing (Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1991; Bassanini and Dosi, 1998) . Another benefit of first-mover strategy is gaining higher penetration in market expanding and leveraging network development 38 (Katz and Another element of benefit from the prospective success of TD-SCDMA is its ability to produce applications programs specific to the TD-SCDMA system. The network effect deriving from complementary products also helps tilt the market in favor of TD-SCDMA.
Currently mobile TV based on a Chinese indigenous application program called CMMD is applied to TD-SCDMA standard 39 . If more programs specific for TD-SCDMA could be developed TD-SCDMA could have a better chance to win the market.
An important factor affecting the operators' selection of standard is its potential of continual improvement where transmission data rate is the key performance indicator. All sponsors of the three main 3G standards (WCDMA, CDMA2000 and TD-SCDMA) have devoted themselves to continual evolution following the market deployment of their respective systems. The original transmission speed specified by ITU (i.e., 144 kbit/s for vehicular high speed; 384 kbit/s for medium speed; and 2048 kbit/s for indoor) is too low to realize multi-media data service function. More recent versions of the major standards 40 (including TD-SCDMA) can support up to 14 Mbit/s at which speed some multi-media application programs can be better applied.
In the longer term, all these three major 3G standards are moving towards LTE (stands for Long Term Evolution) version, aiming to compete against an alternative wireless system 39 Another application applied to TD-SCDMA standard is video phone. 40 The evolution version of WCDMA is HSDPA, HSUPA; CDMA2000 EV-DO, CDMA2000 EV-DV for CDMA2000; China also has developed its enhanced version of TD-SCDMA -HSDPA. Another lesson from the TD-SCDMA development is how to find partners for technology development. The breakup of cooperation between Datang Mobile and Siemens as well as the 41 WiMAX has emerged as one of the leading standards designed to deliver both fixed and mobile wireless broadband, backed by a consortium led by Intel, Motorola and others. Currently, it is supported by the IEEE, the global computing body, and ITU. This system is based on TCP/IP -the technology that underpins the internet. Technically it is called IEEE 802.16 standard and designed to deliver IP data traffic at multiple megabits per second over a range of several kilometers. As its designed speed is much higher than that of the original version of the three dedicated network-based systems (i.e., WCDMA, CDMA2000 and TD-SCDMA), WiMAX sponsors claim it a 4G system. However, in order to facilitate the commercialization and earlier market deployment, it applied to ITU for a 3G standard status and gained the approval on October 19th, 2007. At present, it is already being deployed by Sprint and Clearwire in the US and SK in Korea. 42 It is a National High-Tech R&D Program labeled "863" FuTURE project. For details about China's Science and Technology system , please see Whalley and Zhou (2007) . 43 China claims that this pilot network is the world's first 4G mobile communications trial system. Before that in September 2006 Samsung Electronics claimed at the annual Samsung 4G Forum in Jeju Island that it had developed the world's first demonstration of 4G mobile technology whose data rates have reached 100Mbps on a vehicle moving at up to 60kms/hr, with cell-to-cell handover, and up to 1Gbps inside the exhibition area. China's activity in international standards setting has to be seen as part of China's wider development policy. This is based on ever deeper integration into the global economy, continual product quality upgrading to underpin export growth, and reduced reliance on expensive foreign IPR. In part the source of these policies lie with China's so-called "technology trap". According to Kennedy (2006) Therefore, China's strategy for extensive government involvement in standards setting and its commercialization, as in the case of TD-SCDMA, thus need to also be seen relative to these constraints and the broader objectives of development policy. But whether effective commercialization can be achieved at reasonable cost, and how easy further international negotiation will be remains unproven. At the end of the day TD-SCDMA may remain for a whole as largely a standard for the domestic Chinese market on which future development can build, and it can evolve into a 4G standard. The saving in foreign license fees may still justify the financial investment in the standard, and if this is so this approach may be the one used with future standards initiatives. 46 As a matter of fact, Chinese government support to TD-SCDMA during its commercialization has been cautious and gradual, which is partly reflected in the planned licensing covering three standards instead of one for TD-SCDMA.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discuss Chinese experience with both international negotiation of 3G standard (TD-SCDMA) and its subsequent commercialization. Our discussion is in the context of China's wider development strategy based on quality upgrading, and achieving an innovative economy. Standards setting in telecom used to be an area reserved for developed countries. Chinese entry into this field has aroused great interests as well as doubts. In view of the highly intensive R&D investment required for standard development and deployment, together with the complicated negotiation in global standards competition, it seems to be ambitious for China to develop the TD-SCDMA initiative. And although Chinese efforts have resulted in some progress, it is still uncertain how successful the TD-SCDMA strategy will be and by how much China can benefit. But even if its deployment is mainly in the Chinese market, the savings in foreign license fees may justify the effort.
This paper first describes briefly the general wireless standardization process and the main Chinese and international organizations involved in 3G standards negotiation. It then provides background to Chinese major stakeholders in 3G standardization together with documentation of China's 3G experience of attempts to commercialize. This raises several issues concerning both the proposal process and commercialization as well as its prospective evolution to 4G and an alternative technology -WiMAX.
Due to the complex and evolving nature of wireless technology, it is hard to tell which standard will prove stronger in the long term. Wireless technology experts claim that each have their own advantages which can also be integrated together (Gessler, 2002) . At later stages of 3G harmonization under ITU, the concept of family technology arose with multi radio access technologies grouped together providing interconnection between them to ensure seamless roaming. The key blocking factor for technology integration is intellectual property. With learning by doing/using, China now has the possibility to take part in future market developments. But a lot of detail will determine success or failure of standard setting initiatives, such as R&D cooperation, financing mechanisms, IPR negotiation and others. The emergence of a WiMAX-based standard will likely have substantial impact on the value of the TD-SCDMA standard as well as other wireless technologies.
In conclusion, wireless standard competition is dynamic and hard to predict in outcome, and the technologies involved are extremely complex. What China has done in the 3G area may prove to be pragmatic and well-founded, but how much the intervention will cost in the long term and with what return is unclear. As the nature of high technology is high-risk and high-uncertainty, it is hard to predict whether this Chinese homegrown 3G standard will succeed or not, or how big a market share it can gain. However, even it fails to gain a significant international market share, the domestic market deployment may cover its R&D investment and infrastructure deployment. Its impact on national innovative capacity accumulation and international competitiveness can also still be substantial from a long-term point of view as long as China holds to its current development strategy. 
